Drone warfare on the Korean peninsula by Jackson, Van
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
Korea Economic  
Institute of America
1
Drone Warfare on the Korean Peninsula:  
Paradigm Shift or Paradigm Risk?
By Van Jackson
Abstract
On several occasions since 2013, crashed North Korean drones have 
been discovered in strategically significant areas in South Korea. Do 
North Korean drones represent a threat to Korean security? How is 
North Korea likely to use drones against South Korea and why? To an-
swer these questions, this paper develops a framework that explains 
when violent drone-based provocations are more or less likely to oc-
cur by drawing on the logic of reputation and the historical pattern 
of North Korean coercion. It argues that North Korean drones are no 
cause for panic, but are a potential threat. The paper proposes that 
drone-based provocations are more likely when: 1) its relations with 
the United States and South Korea are openly hostile, and 2) the al-
liance has either a recent history of restraint when challenged with 
coercion or a recent history of bluffing when challenged. Conversely, 
North Korean provocations are less likely when: 1) its relations with 
the United States and South Korea are amicable or 2) its relations 
with the United States and South Korea are hostile but the alliance 
has a recent history of standing firm when challenged with coercion. 
Provocations are motivated by hostile relations, but become pos-
sible only when North Korea believes it can conduct them without 
meaningful consequences. The likelihood of North Korean provo-
cations, therefore, hinges on North Korean perceptions of alliance 
resolve. The paper concludes that the alliance’s approach to North 
Korea may result in the use of drones to conduct a limited attack on 
South Korea if a strategy based on this framework is not developed 
to prevent it. It also recommends the alliance begin work on counter-
drone concepts and capabilities to mitigate vulnerabilities and im-
prove the alliance’s ability to detect, defend, and counter-attack in 
this new domain of competition.
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Introduction
The Question
On September 15, 2014, a small drone1 of North Korean origin 
was discovered near Baengnyong-do in the Yellow Sea.2 Sever-
al months prior, in March and April 2014, similar North Korean 
drones were also found in familiar areas of South Korea: the 
Northwest Islands in the Yellow Sea; Paju, near the Demilitarized 
Zone (DMZ) north of Seoul; and in the mountainous northeast 
corridor in South Korea, also near the DMZ.3 All three areas are 
strategically significant, and at least one of the drones contained 
recorded images of the Blue House. The year prior, North Korean 
media reported that Kim Jong-un observed a military exercise 
during which “super precision drone planes” launched a “preci-
sion drone attack” against simulated South Korean targets.4 Does 
North Korea’s development and use of drones require a new par-
adigm for Korean security? Should we be concerned that North 
Korea has begun incorporating “drones” into its lexicon of threat 
making? Or, as some analysts have suggested, is the drone threat 
from Pyongyang “overblown?”5
The Argument
Eschewing the extremes of fear on the one hand and outright 
dismissal on the other, this paper argues that the significance of 
North Korean drones for questions of strategy and stability will 
largely depend on U.S. and South Korean policy decisions. Spe-
cifically, North Korea is most likely to use drones offensively un-
der two conditions: 1) when relations between North and South 
are openly hostile, and 2) when the U.S.-ROK alliance has either a 
history of backing down from provocations of a comparable scale 
or a history of making empty threats in response to comparable 
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past provocations. The likelihood of use also increases if the U.S.-
ROK alliance has a suspected or demonstrated operational vul-
nerability to drones. Conversely, North Korea is least likely to em-
ploy drones offensively during either periods of détente or when 
the U.S.-ROK alliance has developed a history of standing firm in 
response to comparable provocations. These “predictions” are 
based on deductive and inductive reasoning, fitting with both 
the logic of a reputation for resolve in the academic literature 
and the observable pattern of North Korean violence over time.
Policy Relevance
Although the Korean Peninsula is no stranger to military robot-
ics, no scholar or policymaker has suggested how we should 
think about the use of unmanned military systems, or how to 
interpret evidence of its use. The absence of a useful framework 
for interpreting the investment and employment of “drones” is 
particularly troubling because there is a risk that North Korea 
could surprise the U.S.-ROK alliance by using unmanned systems 
offensively. If policymakers in the United States and South Korea 
do not understand when undesirable North Korean actions are 
more or less likely, they will face difficulty formulating a strategy 
that can preserve stability and prevent such actions in the first 
place. By outlining the logic of the offensive use of drones, we 
can improve the ability to coordinate within the U.S.-ROK alli-
ance at the same time that we may be able to take the most 
responsible courses of action.
The Unfolding Robotics Revolution
The spread of robotics technology globally is increasing to the 
point that some now declare that the world has entered an “age 
of robotics,”6 and that militaries and civilian economies are un-
dergoing a “robotics revolution.”7 The diffusion of military robot-
ics in particular is propelled by a combination of factors, includ-
ing the potential to perform “dull, dirty, and dangerous” missions 
that would otherwise expose humans to undesirable condi-
tions,8 the potential for cost savings compared with comparable 
manned systems,9 the dual-use nature of robotics technologies 
and increasing levels of commercial investment, and the possibil-
ity of enabling new concepts for employment or operation rela-
tive to legacy military weapon systems.10
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as one type of robotics tech-
nology tend to draw the most attention, and investments in UAVs 
represent the leading edge of investments in the robotics sector 
more broadly. The Teal Group estimates current global spending 
on UAVs alone at $6.4 billion, and expects it to increase to more 
than $11 billion dollars annually, totaling more than $91 billion, 
in the next decade.11
East Asia is poised to emerge as a global leader driving this broad-
er trend in UAV research, development, and acquisition. A recent 
report indicates that Asian spending on UAV research could reach 
$7.7 billion, and that China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and 
Thailand are expected to make the largest investments.12 China 
has produced more than 1,500 mixed-type UAVs as of 2012, and 
is a leading exporter of UAV technology, alongside the United 
States and Israel.13 Japan, which has invested in commercial-use 
robotics for decades, has also begun building a sizeable fleet of 
unmanned helicopters.14 More meaningful than available invest-
ment figures, however, are the declared ambitions of regional 
actors in the robotics sector. Chinese President Xi Jinping an-
nounced in July 2014 that he intends for the Peoples’ Republic of 
China (PRC) to dominate the global robotics market,15 precisely 
one month after Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzo declared his 
ambition for Japan to lead the region in robotics.16
Whereas South Korea has been less forthcoming, or at least 
more muted, in vocalizing a vision for robotics than China and 
Japan, North Korea has been quite vocal about how it intends to 
use drones in particular. Indeed, North and South Korea are no 
less subject to the incentives driving the global robotics trend 
than China and Japan, and both have a history of finding military 
applications for the technology.
North Korea has already sent small, crude drones into South Ko-
rea for the apparent purpose of collecting intelligence, and the 
North’s media proclamations signal North Korea’s intention to 
use drones to swarm tactical military targets in the South with 
“kamikaze drones.”17 It may be that North Korea’s adoption of 
drones for missions traditionally reserved for manned aircraft in 
other nations’ militaries (that is, intelligence collection and of-
fensive strikes) will revive the decrepit North Korean Air Force, 
which has been saddled with high maintenance costs and early 
Soviet era MiG fighters and bombers. And although North Korea 
likely has the industrial capacity to indigenously produce military-
grade drones, the assets captured in South Korea in 2013 and 
2014 were revealed to be civilian-manufactured drones made in 
China,18 which underscores the ease of configuring cheap, civil-
ian UAV technology for the purpose of military missions.19 North 
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Korea’s Air Force has been one of the least threatening aspects 
of its military,20 but that threat picture could shift dramatically if 
it moves toward fielding the world’s first drone-reliant Air Force 
and the U.S.-ROK alliance does not adapt accordingly.
For its part, in addition to benefiting from U.S. drones, South 
Korea has begun procuring Global Hawk and developing mul-
tiple types of indigenous drones designed for Intelligence, Sur-
veillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection against North Ko-
rean targets.21 South Korea’s arsenal includes at least 100 of the 
Israeli-made Harpy, a cruise missile categorized as a UAV for its 
ability to loiter in the air for long periods of time before sens-
ing radar targets and attacking autonomously.22 South Korea has 
also already employed ground-based robotic systems along the 
DMZ as machine gun-armed sentries that can autonomously 
detect and target intruders but requires human permission 
to fire.23 There are additional reports of South Korea develop-
ing a “devil killer” ground attack drone.24 Plus, for more than a 
decade, South Korea has operated the indigenously produced 
RQ-101, a multirole tactical drone capable of supporting battle-
field commanders with all-weather imagery, damage assess-
ments, and targeting.25 It is possible that South Korea sees UAVs 
as little more than a defense industrial market segment that 
will help the broader national economy and seeks to develop 
drones indigenously simply for the purpose of export; whether 
it has more strategic intentions with its diverse drone programs 
remains to be seen. But irrespective of whether it has in mind 
a larger vision for its robotics research, development, acquisi-
tion, and employment, it is noteworthy that South Korea is not 
limiting itself to robotics within a single domain or for a single 
purpose. Nor is it relying only on either the United States or in-
digenous development; it has already joined a co-development 
partnership with Israel.26
A Reputational Framework for Drone Provocations
The global “robotics revolution” described in the previous sec-
tion has long since made its way to the Korean Peninsula, and 
North Korea in particular seems intent on using simple, low-alti-
tude tactical drones to scout and attack targets in South Korea, 
though it has not yet done the latter. Nothing about North Ko-
rea’s adoption of UAV technology itself indicates when it is like-
ly to employ drones for attack purposes. Because war or open 
conflict would be an obvious condition when North Korea would 
be likely to use attack drones, this paper focuses on a problem 
that is much harder to discern: when North Korea is likely to use 
drones for lethal provocations.
The Logic of Reputations for Resolve
The deductive approach to this problem draws on the logic of 
reputations for resolve. Based on Thomas Schelling’s articulation, 
the concept of reputation describes the causal relevance of the 
past to the future through the perceptions of others, a phenom-
enon referred to as the “interdependence of commitments”; a 
state’s resolve to prevent some proscribed action at one place 
and time will influence others’ perception of that state’s resolve 
later.27 A generation of scholars invested in research on this con-
cept,28 the logic of which tells us that in an anarchical interna-
tional system, states lack information about other states’ inten-
tions, which leads them to pay particular attention to word and 
deed as a way to approximate the intentions of others.29
As a result, state A’s decision to either stand firm against or back 
down from state B when challenged is likely to affect state B’s 
perception of state A’s resolve subsequently. If state A backs 
down, state B is most likely to judge that state A lacks resolve to 
retaliate or risk war in comparable future circumstances, which 
means state B should believe it could repeat comparable actions 
in the future without expecting retaliation. For similar reasons, 
if state A gets caught bluffing, making threats that it is not will-
ing to execute, it may unintentionally reveal not only a lack of 
resolve, but also a lack of credibility—if it makes threats in the 
future, state B is less likely to believe them.30 By contrast, if state 
B stands firm when challenged by demonstrating a willingness 
to retaliate or risk escalation, state B is most likely to judge that 
state A will not tolerate similar challenges in the future, which 
should deter state B from pursuing comparable such actions in 
the future. Of course, while state B’s decision to challenge or pro-
voke is partly informed by reputation, other factors shown to be 
part of such a calculation include military capabilities and the 
balance of interests in the issue at stake.31
Crucially, however, state B’s likelihood of challenging state A 
repeatedly does not only depend on reputation, capabilities, 
and interests, but also the enduring relational context. State A’s 
reputation for resolve (or irresoluteness) should affect the likeli-
hood of future challenges only when hostile bilateral relations 
persist. If state A backs down, therefore, it should not also take 
belligerent actions that signal hostility. Similarly, if state A stands 
firm, even if successful in deterring future similar challenges, 
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the decision to stand firm will likely not be cost free if it simul-
taneously continues to incite rivalry-like conditions through bel-
ligerent or confrontational statements or policies; state B will 
simply find new ways to express its hostility and challenge state 
A by exploiting “gray” areas where the opponent’s resolve is less 
clear. Violent provocations can take many forms, but they can 
be understood as the result of a persistent context of bilateral 
hostility while simultaneously taking actions that demonstrate a 
lack of resolve.
The Pattern of North Korean Provocations
An alternative approach draws on North Korea’s observed his-
tory of provocations, which, while too voluminous to cover ex-
haustively here, reveals a similar causal pattern as the logic of 
reputations for resolve would expect. On May 17, 1963, for ex-
ample, North Korea captured a U.S. Army helicopter, held the 
two crewmembers, and demanded an apology and admission 
of espionage from the U.S. Government. After several rounds of 
direct, quiet negotiations between the United States and North 
Korea, the United States capitulated to North Korea’s demands, 
signing something called an “overwrite receipt.”32 The “overwrite 
receipt” method of apology constituted North Korea drafting 
an embarrassing apology and admission of guilt for the United 
States to sign. The commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)—who 
is “dual-hatted” as the commander of United Nations Command 
in Korea—then signed this apology, not admitting to its contents, 
but rather as an acknowledgment of its receipt.33
In January 1968, a more familiar crisis erupted involving the USS 
Pueblo, a U.S. naval intelligence collection vessel. North Korea 
forcibly captured and held hostage the Pueblo and its 81-man 
crew, and after much debate, the United States decided to con-
cede to North Korea’s demands, which were identical to the de-
mands in the 1963 incident. Less than a year later, when Presi-
dent Nixon came to office in 1969, historians often recall North 
Korea’s attack on the EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft in April, but 
less frequently discussed is a North Korean downing of a U.S. 
helicopter in the DMZ area in August that same year. North Ko-
rea again detained the crew and demanded the same terms of 
apology—through the “overwrite receipt”—that it demanded 
and received in the 1963 and 1968 incidents. In each of these 
instances, repeated U.S. concessions incentivized North Korea to 
simply repeat its actions, expecting that the United States would 
not retaliate because it had not in the past.
The logical converse also seems to bear out in North Korea’s histo-
ry. For decades, North Korea launched lethal provocations against 
the United States, and each time, the United States judged that 
restraint or concessions were appropriate responses. In August 
1976, however, U.S. officials made a different calculation when 
North Korean soldiers assigned to Panmunjom bludgeoned to 
death two U.S. soldiers with axe handles. When the U.S. soldiers 
ignored North Korean warnings against trimming a poplar tree in 
Panmunjom, North Korean soldiers threatened them with death, 
and then followed through on the threat. These actions became 
the trigger for what is now popularly known as the “Panmunjom 
axe murder” incident.
In response to North Korea’s attack at Panmunjom, the Henry 
Kissinger-led Washington Special Action Group and President 
Ford decided to defy North Korea’s warnings against trimming 
the tree by sending in a team to chop the tree down altogeth-
er, in conjunction with a massive show of force and political 
demands for a North Korean apology. In response, Kim Il-sung 
issued a personal apology—albeit highly equivocally—for the 
deaths of the U.S. soldiers and agreed to U.S. demands for the 
removal of several North Korean guard posts in the Joint Secu-
rity Area as a measure intended to prevent similar future inci-
dents. The factors involved in Kim Il-sung’s decision to not only 
allow U.S. and ROK forces to defy the prior threats of North 
Korean soldiers but also to at least partly capitulate to U.S. de-
mands is more complex than the brief incident narrative pro-
vided here.34 Nevertheless, alliance actions in this case did in-
duce fear in North Korea of retaliation and conflict escalation, 
and that fear did in turn affect Kim Il-sung’s decision to have 
North Korea respond with conciliation rather than its more 
typical vitriol.35
Following the Panmunjom crisis, North Korea rarely targeted U.S. 
soldiers in future violent provocations, though it found other 
ways to coerce, including through the use of violence, by exploit-
ing circumstances in which either U.S. or South Korean resolve 
was less well established. By “designing around deterrence,” the 
problem of provocations not only persisted but became worse in 
some respects, even though the United States had established 
its resolve with respect to deliberate, unambiguous violence 
against its forces. After the Panmunjom crisis, for instance, North 
Korea began focusing its violent tactics on South Korea and fa-
voring highly asymmetric attacks like terrorist bombings and as-
sassination attempts.36
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A crucial necessary condition in each of these instances was 
overt hostility between North and South Korea, as well as be-
tween North Korea and the United States. North Korea issued 
daily threats in the latter half of the 1960s, and its incidents 
of military violence in the DMZ area alone increased from 32 
incidents in 1964 to as many as 500 incidents by 1967.37 During 
periods of rapprochement, such as the early 1970s and mid-
1990s, such incidents did not occur with nearly such frequency. 
Thus, we see that it is only in a hostile rivalry context that back-
ing down or standing firm exerts an effect on North Korea’s 
likelihood of engaging in similar types of violent provocations 
over time.
The deductive and historically based approaches tell similar 
stories: when the United States and South Korea backed down 
when challenged, North Korea was more likely to believe that it 
could take similar actions again in the future because it judged 
the U.S.-ROK alliance as lacking the resolve to retaliate or risk 
escalation. When the alliance stood firm but hostile relations 
persisted, North Korea was more likely to “design around deter-
rence” by avoiding the specific kind of provocations that the al-
liance proscribed while finding a novel method of provocation 
that it may have believed would stay below the threshold for 
alliance retaliation.
Anticipating Drone-Based Provocations
The above approaches to understanding provocations in gen-
eral give us a framework that we can apply to the question of 
drone-based North Korean provocations. Because North Ko-
rea has yet to attack either U.S. or South Korean targets us-
ing drones, it represents an area where the alliance has not 
had the opportunity to establish “red line” proscriptions. This 
makes drones an optimal means of provocation or coercive 
violence precisely because, from North Korea’s perspective, it 
represents a “gray zone” in alliance precedents relating to de-
terrence. Further, North Korea possesses at least modest drone 
capabilities, has employed them in military exercises, and has 
signaled through government-controlled media statements its 
intent to attack South Korean targets with them.
Whether North Korea repeatedly initiates drone-based provo-
cations on South Korea is thus likely to depend on: 1) the state 
of relations with North Korea and whether the alliance is pursu-
ing actions that it deems particularly hostile; 2) whether com-
parable precedents exist; and 3) how the United States and 
South Korea react to early instances of drone use. This suggests 
a serious problem for U.S. and ROK policymakers seeking to 
prevent North Korea from ever launching any attacks, whether 
by drone or other means. The simplified framework below uses 
ideal-type categories to express how these factors interact to 
affect the likelihood of North Korean drone use for purposes of 
coercive violence.
An argument might be made that a general reputation for re-
solve could somehow be achieved, and that such a generalized 
reputation could apply to deterring drone-based provocations. 
Although possible, the problem is that reputation—much like 
deterrence—depends on context: the more similar the context, 
the more reliably we can anticipate the effect of reputation. Prior 
studies have found that the power of reputations has limits, and 
these limits are not well understood.38 For this reason, we must 
be cautious about our expectations for reputations for resolve es-
tablished with respect to one type of provocations to carry over 
and apply to another type of provocations. There is, however, a 
possibility that North Korea will draw inferences from U.S. and 
ROK responses to its non-violent drone use to judge the risk of a 
violent alliance response. To the extent such logic holds, greater 
firmness in response to discoveries of North Korean drones in 
South Korea—even if only for reconnaissance—would be neces-
sary to prevent violent drone-based provocations.
Implications for Strategy and Policy
What does a framework for drone-based provocations suggest 
for alliance strategy and policy? Technology must be part of the 
solution; certain unique capabilities are required to counter 
North Korean drones. But if North Korea’s likelihood of drone-
based provocations depends largely on alliance word and deed, 
as argued above, then the alliance needs a larger strategy to help 
shape North Korea’s employment of drones and determine its 
own responses to North Korean drone use.
Table 1: The Likelihood of Drone-Based Provocations:  
               A Reputational Framework*
Relational 
Context
History of Backing 
Down when  
Challenged
History of Standing 
Firm when  
Challenged
History of  
Bluffing when 
Challenged
Hostile More Likely Less Likely More Likely
Amicable Less Likely Less Likely Less Likely
*Based on responses to drone use over time
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Counter-Drone Systems and Swarming Concepts
Offsetting North Korean drones through capabilities requires 
much more thinking about what might be described as “counter-
drone” systems and how to optimally use them. Minimally, the 
alliance needs radars capable of detecting small, low-altitude, 
low-speed UAVs. The alliance also needs capabilities that can kinet-
ically target such UAVs, and existing capabilities are suboptimal. 
The cost ratio of cruise missiles to attack UAVs makes them an 
impractical solution; North Korean UAVs are far less expensive 
than alliance cruise missiles, which means exchanging fire in this 
domain favors North Korea. There has also been at least some 
indication that although North Korean drones can evade radar by 
flying at very low altitudes, they can also fly above the range of 
South Korean air defense guns, evading traditional air defenses. 
Even if conventional air defenses could be calibrated to counter 
small, crude drones, they would still need standardized operat-
ing procedures for dealing with swarms of drones—that is, large 
numbers of networked UAVs. And while it should be obvious, al-
liance manned fighter aircraft are also impractical as a counter 
to North Korean UAVs because of the unfavorable size and cost 
ratios, in addition to the risk exposure the pilots would face.
The alliance should therefore begin technical discussions regard-
ing how it might develop its own UAVs in networked “swarms” 
capable of surveillance, defense, and counter-offense. Concepts 
of employment for unmanned systems represent a vastly under-
explored area for military strategy.39 By “chaining,” for example, 
forces can increase the surveillance distance that UAVs are ca-
pable of covering by using teams of UAVs to relay intelligence 
information from a forward area to a rear area. A swarming 
shield of many inexpensive UAVs can, in theory, achieve an effect 
comparable to missile defense interceptors, by creating a virtual 
wall of drones to intercept missiles. Drones equipped with global 
positioning satellite jammers and electronic warfare capabilities 
can disrupt incoming drones with great agility by simply chasing 
or confronting adversary drones and disrupting them through 
their proximity. In a conflict, networked swarms of UAVs can po-
tentially perform the job of counter-offense more efficiently than 
conventional weapons, whether through more accurate target-
ing of an adversary’s mobile weapons systems or by shifting as-
signed targets within a UAV swarm in the middle of a mission 
based on previous target successes and failures. Many concepts 
may not even require the development of new hardware or mid-
dleware. The Naval Postgraduate School’s Consortium for Robot-
ics and Unmanned Systems Education Research, which has been 
at the forefront of experimenting with swarming algorithms and 
defense applications of robotics technologies, has made major 
advances relying on mostly commercial, off-the-shelf technolo-
gies—innovation need not imply high-technology, which is why 
the threat of North Korean drones is immediate.40 As the U.S.-
ROK alliance develops counters to threatening drones in addi-
tion to developing its own, it is imperative that new capabilities 
remain closely tied with new concepts and scenarios. It would be 
tragically shortsighted to develop innovative capabilities without 
considering how such novel hardware can enable new concepts 
for deterrence and defense.
Strategy, Not “Strategic Patience”
But developing the capability to counter North Korean drones is 
not by itself likely to deter or dissuade North Korea from launch-
ing drone-based provocations, particularly if the unit cost of 
UAVs are low. The alliance must be willing to demonstrate that it 
is willing to do more than deny North Korea the military effects 
of its drones. If the alliance simultaneously antagonizes North 
Korea with enduring sanctions, military exercises, and veiled 
threats yet backs down when confronted with acts of violence, 
then future confrontations are all but inevitable. This dynamic 
represents the crucial flaw in a policy of “strategic patience” to-
ward North Korea—it assumes that perpetuating hostility with 
North Korea without being willing to retaliate against provoca-
tions is acceptable. Each decision to stand firm against or back 
down from North Korean coercion cannot be viewed as an in-
dependent, unique event because doing so will always favor 
backing down as a means of controlling escalation. North Korean 
challenges must be treated as temporally interconnected not 
simply because the logic of reputation demands it, but because 
North Korea’s track record with provocations suggests as much.
This should not be automatically interpreted as a call to arms, 
but rather a call to strategy. Decisions to back down or stand firm 
must be put in service of a strategy designed to address the un-
derlying hostility that motivates North Korean provocations in 
the first place. Backing down, for instance, might make sense if 
“The alliance must be willing to 
demonstrate that it is willing to 
do more than deny North Korea 
the military effects of its drones.” 
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the alliance needs to buy time as part of a broader diplomatic 
reconciliation strategy on the one hand or preparation for an alli-
ance coercive military campaign on the other. By contrast, stand-
ing firm might make sense if alliance strategy is consciously con-
frontational and the foremost concern is stopping a specific type 
of provocation—such as by drone—even though doing so may 
well perpetuate provocations of another type (such as North 
Korea’s shift from DMZ attacks to terrorist attacks). The reputa-
tional framework articulated here can thus support hawkish and 
dovish strategies alike, but it cannot support persistent antago-
nism combined with an unwillingness to demonstrate resolve.
Conclusion
Several tentative conclusions may be drawn from the above dis-
cussion. First, North Korea’s offensive drone use will likely be lim-
ited to periods of outright hostility.
Second, as with its history of provocations, drones constitute 
a tool available to probe U.S. and South Korean resolve; North 
Korea will show some discretion in its use—keeping the scope 
limited so that it avoids retaliation or war—but is more likely to 
increase frequency or intensity of use if it believes there will be 
no meaningful consequences of doing so.
Third, as with its history of provocations, North Korea’s violent 
use of drones is of much greater concern than their “strategic” 
or non-violent use because of its potential to trigger crises and 
escalation.
Fourth, North Korea’s Air Force should be monitored carefully for 
observable changes in its order of battle (composition and geo-
graphic distribution) and operational procedures. North Korean 
special operations forces units might retain some drone capabil-
ity, but drones provide a unique opportunity for its Air Force to 
revitalize itself at a uniquely low cost given the poor quality and 
training of manned alternatives to drones.
Fifth, China and Japan have begun competition in robotics that 
promises to have strategic significance for militaries in the re-
gion; North Korea has so far positioned itself as a beneficiary of 
this competition, acquiring Chinese-made UAVs to constitute 
a non-trivial but unknown proportion of its emerging “drone 
force.” This probably violates the UN sanctions regime already 
in place against North Korea, but enforcement—or even inves-
tigation—may depend almost entirely on Chinese cooperation, 
which is unlikely to be forthcoming or effective. North Korea has 
the industrial capacity to not only replicate Chinese drones, but 
to produce its own indigenously; the type of drones they have 
sought so far are low-technology and therefore easy to attain. 
Because drones are already classified internationally as a type 
of cruise missile, new UN Security Council Resolutions should 
not be necessary unless China or others protest the inclusion of 
drones under the extant sanctions regime.
The United States and South Korea must keep pace with this 
emerging robotics trend and evolving technologies with the 
potential to threaten alliance interests. North Korean drones in 
South Korea, KCNA statements about “drone exercises,” and pic-
tures of Kim Jong-un appearing with military drones all consti-
tute signals of North Korea’s intention to incorporate drones into 
future campaigns of military coercion. This should be taken seri-
ously because it represents a potential vulnerability in alliance 
capabilities relative to North Korea in the near term, and relative 
to others in the longer term.
Fortunately, North Korea’s history of provocations suggest that 
its willingness to coerce is at least partially contingent on the 
track record of alliance word and deed. If the alliance can agree 
on an overarching approach that recognizes its decisions have 
temporal consequences—that is, provocation responses affect 
whether and how future provocations occur—there is hope that 
drone-based provocations never become a trend.
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